Introduction
Since 1945, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has played a key role in the functioning of the global economy. The IMF strives to stabilize the global financial system and extends funding to a number of countries. In particular, developing and least developed countries resort to IMF resources, mainly when they face difficulties related to balance of payments.
Thanks to its unique role, the IMF still remains at the center of the international monetary system and the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN). In 2006, the IMF started a reform process at its own initiative at the IMF Board of Governors meeting in Singapore. While these efforts were in Despite all the reform programs, the IMF remains loyal to the principle of conditionality in its financing facilities. The conditionality principle, often involving controversial austerity measures, has sometimes made developing countries reluctant to borrow money from the IMF. The Effects of the IMF's Quota and Governance Reforms on Turkey members are elected from the single-country constituencies while the remaining sixteen members from the multi-country constituencies. The IMF reviews the number of the executive directors every eight years. The voting power assigned to the constituencies differs according to the power of the individual members included in the constituencies (Mountford, 2009; IMF, 2016b) .
Managing Director: The managing director is the chairperson elected by the Executive Board. However, the director does not have a right to vote in the Executive Board. The managing director carries out the administrative work assigned by the Executive Board. He or she is also responsible for the work done by the technical staff working at the IMF and for communicating the proposed policies to the Executive Board. Traditionally, the IMF chief must be a citizen of a Western European country. However, the US' opinion is also highly important in the election of the managing director (Mountford, 2009; Peretz, 2009 ).
IMF Quotas
The quotas are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for all financial transactions carried out by the IMF. The SDR, which is an international reserve asset, was created in 1969 to support the then-used fixed exchange rate system. At the outset, the value of the SDR was set at 0.888671 grams of standard gold (at that time, the equivalent of USD 1.00 in terms of gold). After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, it was recalculated as a currency basket in major currencies of advanced economies. The Executive Board decided to add the Chinese currency renminbi to the currency basket, which sets the value of the SDR, in November 2015. Since October 2016, the weights of the currencies in SDR are as follows: US dollar 41.73%, euro 30.93%, renminbi 10.92%, Japanese yen 8.33% and British pound sterling 8.09% (IMF, 2017a; Keeney, 2017) .
The IMF allocates a quota to each member country, denominated in SDR, that is calculated according to a quota formula. The quota of a member is taken as the basis for all financial transactions made between the IMF and the member countries. Three functions attributed to the quotas are as follows.
Z. Tuğrul GÖVER 5 1-Subscriptions: The maximum capital contribution of a member country is set according to its quota size. Member countries pay 25% of their quota to the IMF in SDR or widely used currencies such as US dollar, euro, and Japanese yen and 75% in their local currencies. The subscription payments constitute the main source for the credits extended by the IMF.
2-Voting power:
The quota of a member also directly affects its voting power. A member's total number of votes is the sum of the number of basic votes and the number of votes dependent on its quota size. The number of basic votes allocated to the members has been increased as part of the reform efforts started in 2008. The relevant amendment to the Articles of Agreement introduced that 5.502% of the total votes would be equally distributed among the member countries. In this way, the weight of the basic votes in the total votes is fixed, no matter how the total size of the quotas would change in the future. Yet, the major part of a member's voting power usually comes from the quota-dependent part. A member is entitled to one vote for every SDR 100,000 in its allocated quota at the IMF. Thus, the larger the quota, the higher the member's voting power would be (IMF, 2011; IMF 2017b) .
3-Access to IMF financing facilities: In principle, the upper limit of the funding that a member can obtain from the IMF is based on the quota allocated to that country. However, there have been a number of cases in which IMF provided such amounts of funds to some countries independent of their quota sizes for the sake of the stability of the global financial system (Copelovitch, 2010) .
The Board of Governors reviews the quotas at regular intervals, usually every five years or when the Executive Board deems it necessary. To change the IMF quotas, the formal approval of three-fifths of the total number of members, which also hold at least 85% of the total voting power, is required. Under the 14 th General Quota Review, completed in 2016, the total amount of the IMF quotas has been raised to approximately SDR 477 billion (IMF, 2017b).
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The IMF's Quota and Governance Reforms between 2006 and 2016
In this section, we explain the 2008 and 2010 reform programs put into practice by the IMF. These sets of reforms have directly affected Turkey's position in the IMF. Since the 2009 reform program, which has dealt with the lending tools offered by the IMF, has not affected Turkey directly, we will not cover it in this study.
2008 Reform Program
The decisions taken regarding quotas and governance at the annual meeting of the IMF presented below (IMF, 2006a; IMF, 2006b; IMF, 2007) .
Board of Governors in
• ad hoc increases in quotas allocated to China, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey, which are deemed to be the most under-represented countries at the IMF in terms of their relative weights in the global economy;
• agreement on a new and simple quota formula until the 2007 annual meeting of the
IMF Board of Governors;
• as the quotas would be re-calculated according to the new formula, another round of ad hoc quota increases would be necessary;
• the Articles of Agreement would be amended to at least double the number of basic votes allocated to each member. Thus, the voting power of low-income countries would be protected; and
• creation of a second alternate executive director position, in such constituencies in which a large number of countries are included, through an amendment to the Articles of Agreement.
Ad hoc quota increases were made for four countries in line with the reform decisions taken in
2006 (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, the quota formula has been simplified, and the complex quota calculation method, which involved five formulae, was replaced with a single quota formula in 2008 (Skala, Thimann, & Wölfinger, 2007; IMF, 2008a) . On the other hand, some of the reform resolutions (IMF, 2008a; IMF, 2008b; IMF, 2008c; IMF, 2011) .
• Introduction of the new quota formula: As we have mentioned, the complex quota calculation method with five formulae used before 2008 has been eliminated. The new quota formula was introduced in 2008 and included four variables with different weights. National income has 50%, the openness variable has 30%, the economic variability indicator has 15% and the international reserve variable has 5% weight in the quota calculation. 1 Additionally, a
1 The national income variable in the formula is a three-year average of GDP (a blend GDP indicator calculated through GDP based on the current exchange rates with 60% weight and GDP based on purchasing power parity exchange rates with 40% weight), the openness variable is the five-year average of the ratio of trade volume to GDP, the variability indicator is the standard deviation of current transfers and net capital flows over the last 13 • Tripling the number of basic votes and boosting the representation of low-income countries: Due to the quota increases completed since 1945, the share of basic votes in total votes has fallen to a level as low as 2.1%. This, in turn, especially negatively affected the voting power of low-income countries. The new arrangement regarding basic votes is expected to triple the number of basic votes by the amendment to the Articles of Agreement. This increase in the basic votes is the first one since the inception of the IMF. The amendment to the agreement has been expected to ensure that the share of the basic votes in the total votes was fixed at 5.502%.
Therefore, future quota increases would not change the share of basic votes in total voting power.
Basic votes will be equally distributed among member countries.
• 
2010 Reform Program
While the approval process of the 2008 reforms 
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• doubling the IMF's overall quota size under the 14 th General Quota Review;
• comprehensive review of the quota formula;
• elimination of the appointed executive directors category and introduction of the allelected IMF Executive Board; and
• reduction in representation of the advanced European countries at the Executive Board.
The first two components mentioned above are related to quotas, while the last two are related to governance of the IMF. At the outset, the 2010 reforms have been scheduled to be completed by the annual meeting of IMF Board of Governors in October 2012. We explain the 2010 reforms in detail in two separate sections below.
Quota-related Reforms

Doubling the IMF's overall quota size under the 14 th General Quota Review.
The IMF's quota size has decayed over time compared to the global economic developments since the last general quota increase in 1998. Thus, the IMF, that sticked with the principle to keep the quotas as the main source of its finances, acknowledged that an overall quota increase has become a necessity by 2010. With the 2010 reform program, it was agreed that the total quota would be increased by 100%, from SDR 238.4 billion to SDR 476.8 billion (IMF, 2010a; IMF, 2011) .
The conditions that had to be met for the quota increases to take effect are 1-the rises in quotas had to be approved by countries representing at least 70% of the total quotas as of November 5, 2010 and 2-the amendment to the Articles of Agreement regarding the structure of the Executive Board should come into force. This amendment could be effective once approved by at least 3/5 of the total number of members (i.e., 113 countries) that also represented at least 85% of the total voting power. This has meant that the implementation of the overall quota increase has been tied to the amendment to the Articles of Agreement (IMF, 2012a).
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The first condition for the implementation of the quota reform was fulfilled by September 2012 (IMF, 2012b) . 124 members that held 73.4% of the total voting power approved the overall quota increase in 2012. As regards the second condition, the approval procedure was complicated to some extent because it consisted of two parts. As of end-2012, 129 countries, well above the required 113, accepted the amendment to the Articles of Agreement. Hence, the first part of the second condition has been fulfilled quite quickly. However, the second part, that required the consent of at least 85% of the voting power, could not be met for about three years (see Table 2) because the US did not accept the amendments to the Articles of Agreement until December 2015. Holding more than 15% of the votes, the US exercised its veto power. Consequently, quota increases have not become effective until January 2016 (IMF, 2016b). countries consisted of all G-7 members and China, Saudi Arabia and Russia. The total voting power of the top 10 countries stood around 54.5%. Turkey with a quota of SDR 964 million had a voting power of 0.45% (see Table 3 ). As of the end of April 2016, the US still ranks first in terms of quota size and voting power. In addition, the US retained its veto power over the changes to the IMF's Articles of Agreement since its voting power remained above 15% after the 2010 quota reform. By 2016 a G-7 member, namely Canada, has dropped out of the top 10, while all the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) had places among the top 10. However, the total voting power of the BRIC countries remained at 13.65%. Accordingly, BRIC countries have not been able to gain veto power in the aftermath of the 2010 reforms. As a result of the quota increases between 2006 and 2016, Turkey's quota and voting power jumped to SDR 4,658.6 million and 0.96%, respectively (Table 4) . 
Comprehensive review of the quota formula
Another major element of the reform package has been the revision of the quota formula.
As we have mentioned earlier throughout the study, a change in the quota formula leads to changes in quota sizes of IMF members. Table   5 ). Table 5 ). Within the scope of the 2010 governance reforms, a new constituency has been created with a voting power of 3.22%, in which Central and Eastern European Countries are involved. We analyze the potential alternative international funding sources that can be extended to developing countries in the next section.
The Effects
The Layers of the Global Financial Safety Net Complementary to the IMF
Developing countries that want to use other sources of finance in addition to the IMF when balance of payments problems arise have established a number of international organizations. However, these institutions have not matured enough to provide an alternative to the IMF in terms of both operational capacity and available funds. We presume the underlying reasons for this situation are 1) the IMF still protects its dominant role as a global institution in the GFSN and 2) the other international organizations consider themselves complementary to the IMF rather than alternatives. Nonetheless, these organizations can be regarded as a good starting 
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF)
The AMF, which has currently 22 members, was created in 1976 for financing the balance of payments needs of Arab countries. The headquarters of the AMF is located in the United Arab
Emirates. The AMF's highest decision-making body is the Council of Governors. Daily work is carried out by the Board of Executive Directors, which has eight members. The assets and liabilities of the fund are denominated in its own currency, the Arab accounting dinar (AAD), which is assumed to be equivalent to three SDRs. Subscriptions and AMF reserves constitute the main source of the financial facilities that member countries can obtain from the AMF. In 2013, billion (USD 152 billion). This figure is much higher than the amount that is available at the AMF. As of 2016, some AMF countries have standing loan agreements with the IMF, and their total debt is SDR 3.5 billion (USD 4.9 billion). Hence, we conclude that the AMF members admitted to taking harder policy actions to draw larger loans from the IMF (IMF, 2016b; AMF, 2017).
Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas, FLAR)
FLAR was established in 1989 to provide financial support to Latin American countries in the face of balance of payments problems. 3 The organization has currently eight members have never defaulted. FLAR has committed a total of USD 13 billion in loans to its members from its inception till the end of 2016. Balance of payments loans constitute around 52% of the loan agreements, whereas liquidity loans represent 40% of the total amount. FLAR has approved the credit facilities within a month on average, and the loans have not been subject to any conditionality. These features of the loans imply that the requirements for borrowing from FLAR are quite flexible (Ocampo & Titelman, 2012; Titelman, Vera, Carvallo, & Perez Caldentey, 2013; Ocampo, 2015; FLAR, 2017a; FLAR, 2017b) .
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Financial sources of FLAR are relatively low compared to those the member countries can borrow from the IMF. However, we presume that those two figures are relatively closer to one another for Costa Rica, Bolivia and Paraguay. For example, Paraguay can obtain a potential loan from the IMF through an SBA of USD 1.2 billion, and it can borrow up to USD 600 million from FLAR. Therefore, FLAR, which offers financial facilities with more flexible terms, can be considered an alternative to the IMF for these countries. As of 2016, FLAR members have a total IMF quota of around SDR 9 billion (USD 12.8 billion). The total amount that these countries can obtain from the IMF through SBAs is about SDR 39.3 billion (USD 55.5 billion) cumulatively.
Countries that are willing to engage in relatively large credit agreements have to apply to the IMF. For example, Colombia signed a precautionary Flexible Credit Line (FCL) agreement with the IMF for SDR 8.2 billion (USD 11.5 billion) in 2016 against global risks. Therefore, we presume that FLAR cannot be an alternative to the IMF in the current situation, but might be a good complement to it (Ocampo, 2015; IMF, 2016a; IMF, 2016b) .
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)
The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI 4 ), which was established by China, Japan and South Kong. The main financing method is multilateral swap arrangements between countries that are parties to the CMIM treaty. Thus, from 2010 onward, the CMIM replaced bilateral swap arrangements (BSA) with multilateral swap agreements. A quota has been set for each country that is party to the CMIM. Under the CMIM, a member that needs liquidity will sell its local 4 In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Crisis, the CMI was created in 2000 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and China, Japan and South Korea to improve regional financial co-operation. It was expected that in cases of balance of payments problems, the ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea would make bilateral swap arrangements (BSA).
One can take the creation date of the ASEAN arrangements (ASA) back to 1977. Between 1979 and 1992, the ASEAN members made five small-scale swap arrangements. However, after the Asian Crisis, it was deemed necessary to strengthen this framework. Over time, the members started to sign BSAs within the CMI. As of 2009, CMI members had signed 16 BSAs for a total amount of USD 90 billion. The countries that signed the CMI treaty were allowed to make BSAs that amounted to 10% of their quotas without an IMF agreement. This proportion was raised to 20% in 2005 (Henning, 2002; Kawai, 2015) . 5 ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea are also known as ASEAN +3. follows. 1) the total size of the potential swap agreements, previously USD 120 billion, has been increased to USD 240 billion; 2) the de-linked portion has been raised to 30% of the quota of a CMIM member; 3) a new lending tool (CMIM precautionary line, CMIM-PL) was introduced for the prevention of crises; and 4) the maturities and availability periods of the financing facilities provided by the CMIM have been extended. After these amendments, the total funds that some CMIM members (e.g., Malaysia and Thailand) could potentially obtain from the CMIM exceeded the funds they could borrow from the IMF through SBAs. However, no member country has yet utilized the CMIM since the amendments came into force. For institutionalization purposes, the ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Center (AMRO) was established in 2011, with a mission to carry out the administrative work of the CMIM. The AMRO helps the CMIM enhance its institutional and operational capacity. In 2016, the AMRO conducted a test run on the use of IMF-linked portion of its financing facilities with the support of the IMF (Kawai, 2015; AMRO, 2017a; AMRO, 2017b) .
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)
The CRA was created in 2014 by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and the CRA treaty went into force in 2015. We regard the CRA as different from AMF, FLAR and CMIM because the BRICS are not based on regional cooperation. The BRICS countries have agreed that the CRA would support the GFSN and play a complementary role in the existing international monetary and financial system. The CRA was established to provide financial support to potential short-term balance of payments problems. A total of USD 100 billion has been committed by the BRICS countries for the CRA, and a quota has been allocated to each member. Similarly to the CMIM, the CRA also has IMF-linked and de-linked portions.
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The financing that can be accessed without an IMF commitment (de-linked portion) is limited to 30% of the country quota, and needless to say, the IMF-linked portion under the CRA is set at 70%. In case a member needed liquidity in US dollars under the CRA, it will sell its local currency to buy USD for a maximum term of one year. Depending on the financing tool, it is possible to extend the maturity twice or three times. The highest decision-making body of the CRA is the Governing Council, in which the governors of the central banks or the ministers of finance participate. The Governing Council has such authorities as granting membership to the CRA or changing the de-linked portion of the country quotas. The other component of the governance, the Standing Committee, is responsible for the daily administrative work of the CRA (BRICS, 2014; Cattaneo, Biziwick, & Fryer, 2015; He, 2016) .
The BRICS countries had a total quota of around SDR 70.6 billion (USD 100 should be given to boosting the financial capabilities of the CRA to make the organization more functional. Moreover, it has been recommended that the CRA should make arrangements to develop institutional capacity and conduct surveillance activities on member countries in a similar way to the CMIM/AMRO (Cattaneo, Biziwick, & Fryer, 2015; He, 2016) .
Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSA)
During and after the 2008-2009 GFC, the central banks' interest in bilateral swap arrangements has risen significantly due to the extraordinary need for liquidity worldwide.
Because of the global effects of the crisis, several swap arrangements have been made between the central banks of the advanced economies. However, since the scope of this study is limited to developing countries, we will focus on the developing country-developing country and developed South Korea Central Bank and the FED has been put forward as a striking example of the CMI's ineffectiveness. It was argued that this BSA was so influential that it played a partial role in the CMI's transformation into the CMIM in 2009 (Aizenman, Jinjarak, & Park, 2010; IMF, 2016d) .
On the other hand, the PBOC has aimed at increasing the weight of the Chinese renminbi in global trade and international reserves through bilateral swap arrangements. Contrary to the FED, the PBOC has not attached much importance to the economic foundations of the developing economy that signed the BSA. Instead, the PBOC considers whether the counterparty had a significant share in China's export volume. As of the end of 2015, the total amount of the 33
BSAs signed by the PBOC denominated in renminbi reached about yuan 3.3 trillion (approximately USD 500 billion) (IMF, 2016d; PBOC, 2016) .
There is no mechanism within the FED or the PBOC to closely monitor the macroeconomic outlook of the counterparty developing countries. Moreover, in contrast with the IMF facilities, those particular swap arrangements do not include any conditionality provisions.
Therefore, there is a possibility of counterparty risk, which means that the dollar-borrowing or (Aizenman, Jinjarak, & Park, 2010) .
Conclusion and the Policy Options for Turkey
The Quota and Governance Reform, which doubled the total IMF quotas, entered into force in 2016.
The IMF raised its total quotas to SDR 477 billion, reaching a fund size that could meet global liquidity needs. In terms of quota sizes, the other components of the GFSN (i.e., AMF, FLAR, CMIM and CRA) remained at a significantly lower level than the IMF.
The IMF reform efforts during the period 2006-2016 yielded positive results to Turkey in terms of its quota size, voting power and representation. Thanks to the reform packages, Turkey will be able to borrow remarkably more IMF resources in the future. However, the conditionality principle inherent in the IMF financing may require austerity measures that Turkey may be reluctant to implement. For this reason, it is important for Turkey to explore alternative external financing sources that can be obtained on more flexible terms. Under the current circumstances, we suggest that it may be in Turkey's interest to consider the following policy options.
Firstly, given the current situation, Turkey should strive to protect its gains in the IMF and increase them whenever possible. It should also try to defend its power at the IMF Executive
Board during the renewal negotiations of the constituency agreement.
Turkey can get in touch with the other components of the GFSN to expand the potential external financial resources it can access. Among the four international organizations discussed within this study, the AMF, FLAR and the CMIM do not constitute promising alternatives for Turkey since they have been established to enhance cooperation within certain regions. However, Assistance (Istemi, 1985; Cortuk, 2006; IMF, 2015 ) (see Table 6 ). Istemi (1985) , Cortuk (2006) , IMF.
We explain the financial tools that Turkey used in the past, but not currently offered by the IMF, in the following part.
Supplemental Reserve Facility
The IMF began to offer the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) when the Asian crisis emerged in 1997. The Fund aimed at providing short-term financing for the balance of payments problems that arose due to the crisis in the IMF members. It was an option only available when a member had an active SBA or EFF, and when policies were in place to establish market confidence. The (Cortuk, 2006; IMF, 2009) .
Compensatory Financing Facility
The Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) was put into practice in 1963. It was used to provide medium-term financing to the member countries that had trade deficits which emanated from the deterioration in terms of trade. The IMF extended the CFF only if an exogenous shock deteriorated the terms of trade. The IMF terminated offering the CFF following the reform on lending tools. Turkey used the Compensatory Financing Facility due to the oil shocks that occurred between 1975 and 1980 (Cortuk, 2006; IMF, 2009 ).
Oil Facility
The Oil Facility was used to finance the member countries' balance of payments in the face of the sudden rise in oil prices in the 1970s. Turkey used the Oil Facility in 1975 and 1976. The IMF no longer offers the Oil Facility (Cortuk, 2006) .
Emergency Assistance
The Emergency Assistance was a financial facility that was available to member states that suffered from internal conflicts or, natural disasters. Credits for natural disasters were available since 1962 already. Additionally, the IMF began to offer the post-conflict loans since 1995.
Turkey used the Emergency Assistance in 1999 due to the Marmara earthquake. This lending instrument was converted into the rapid financing instrument (RFI) in 2011 (IMF, 2012a) .
